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Finally, the state courts have recognized the federal position.
Taylor v. United States, 224 Mass. 639, 88 N.E.2d 121 (1949),
cert. denied, 338 U.S. 948 (1949). A state probate court had
ruled a United States tax claim barred by a short state time statute.
Reversing, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that
the United States as a creditor of the alleged insolvent estate was
not barred by the statute in a state court. The principal case would
strengthen this holding and the federal government's position before
state courts.
In summary, for reasons of public policy and the maintenance
of a uniformity of laws, state time limitations do not apply to the
federal government when reducing a perfected tax lien to judgment.
James Kilgore Edmundson, Jr.

Instructions-Binding Instruction on Contributory Negligence
Need Not State Specific Acts of Negligence
P, a pedestrian, was struck and injured by an automobile operated by D. At the trial, the court, at the request of D, instructed
the jury that it must find for D if it should believe that "... both
plaintiff and defendant were guilty of negligence which combined
and contributed to cause the accident. . . ." On cross-appeal, P
averred that this instruction was erroneous. Held, instruction proper.
It is not necessary for a binding instruction on contributory negligence to state specific acts of negligence by the plaintiff, disapproving
Walker v. Robertson, 141 W. Va. 563, 91 S.E.2d 468 (1956).
Graham v. Wriston, 120 S.E.2d 713 (W. Va. 1961).
The problem of phrasing instructions on contributory negligence has been the subject of much litigation in the West Virginia
courts. In expressly disapproving the holding in Walker v. Robertson, supra, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals has decisively settled any doubt concerning the requirements of such an
instruction in this state. The Walker case disrupted a previously
unbroken line of decisions in this state concerning contributory
negligence, and the holding in the principal case has now removed
that blemish from the law.
In the Walker case, the court instructed the jury that if it
believed from the evidence that ". . . the plaintiff was guilty of
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committing any act of negligence, however slight, which proximately contributed to causing the injuries . . .you must return a

verdict for the defendant." (Emphasis added.) The trial court
amended this instruction by striking out the word must and substituting the word may, thus changing it to a permissive instruction,
rather than a binding one. The court, in a three to two decision,
held that a binding instruction must state the acts or conduct constituting contributory negligence of which the plaintiff is allegedly
guilty. This was not done and thus the instruction as amended was
proper.
The court in the Walker case predicated its finding upon four
prior West Virginia cases, viz., Bragg v. C. I. Whitten Transfer Co.,
125 W. Va. 722, 26 S.E.2d 217 (1943); Lawson v. Dye, 106 W.
Va. 494, 145 S.E. 817 (1928); Burdette v. Henson, 96 W. Va. 31,
122 S.E. 356 (1924); Woodell v. West Virginia Improvement Co.,
38 W. Va. 23, 17 S.E. 386 (1893). The dissent, however, pointed
out that these cases dealt with instructions which were incomplete
because they were based upon certain enumerated facts, but omitted
material facts supported by the evidence. These cases enunciate
the rule that a binding instruction offered by the plaintiff, based
upon certain enumerated facts supported by the evidence, must not
omit any material facts, and must be complete in and of itself.
However, both the Walker case and the principal case dealt with
instructions offered by the defendant and not the plaintiff. The
danger of incomplete instructions is that the jury will be misled
into believing that only the facts enumerated in the instruction may
properly be considered by them in arriving at a verdict. Wiggin
v. Marsh Lumber Co., 77 W. Va. 7, 87 S.E. 194 (1915). It is
difficult to perceive how the cases relied on by the court support
its holding in the Walker case, since no facts upon which a finding
for the defendant would be justified were included in the instruction,
and none were omitted which would prejudice the plaintiff.
In the instant case, the instruction is complete in and of itself,
and could in no way mislead the jury since it is an accurate statement of the law of contributory negligence in West Virginia. It
has long been recognized in this state that contributory negligence
of the plaintiff, which proximately contributed to the injury, is an
absolute bar to recovery. Belcher v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 140 W. Va.
848, 87 S.E.2d 616 (1955); Burr v. Curry, 137 W. Va. 364, 71
S.E.2d 313 (1952); Overby v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry., 37 W. Va.
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524, 16 S.E. 813 (1893). The holding in the Walker case has not
been followed in negligence cases. In fact, later decisions reaffirm
the rule that contributory negligence is an absolute bar to recovery.
Crum v. Ward, 122 S.E.2d 18 (W. Va. 1961); Workman v. Wynne,
142 W. Va. 135, 94 S.E.2d 665 (1956). Therefore, a permissive
instruction on contributory negligence is definitely erroneous, for
a jury could find for the plaintiff irrespective of the fact that his
negligence proximately contributed to his injury.
The majority decision in the Walker case has been criticized as
misapplying the law. Comment, 59 W. VA. L. REv. 278 (1957).
The writer expressed the view that by changing the binding instruction to a permissive one the defendant was deprived of the defense
of contributory negligence. In addition, he stated that the court
was making new law by requiring specific acts of negligence to be
embodied in a contributory negligence instruction. It is interesting
to note that the commentary, in effect, predicted that the dissent
was the correct law. The holding in the principal case has verified
this prediction.
The instruction in the instant case, as well as in the Walker
case, was an abstract instruction in that it did not incorporate specific
acts of negligence predicated upon the evidence. A well recognized
rule is that the mere giving of abstract instructions, independently
of whether they do or do not state correct rules of law, does not
constitute reversible error unless prejudice is shown, or the jury was
misled. 88 C.J.S. Trial § 379 (1955). West Virginia follows this
rule, with the addition of other requisites which must be fulfilled.
The instruction must be complete in and of itself, and must be a
correct statement of the law. Davis v. Fire Creek Fuel Co., 144
W. Va. 537, 109 S.E.2d 144 (1959); Butcher v. Stull, 140 W. Va.
31, 82 S.E.2d 278 (1954). The instruction must not tend to mislead
or confuse the jury. Overton v. Fields, 117 S.E.2d 598 (W. Va.
1960); Hartley v. Crede, 140 W. Va. 133, 82 S.E.2d 672 (1954).
Lastly, there must be some evidence upon which to predicate a
finding by the jury under such an instruction. Dangerfield v. Akers,
127 W. Va. 409, 33 S.E.2d 140 (1945); Neely v. Cameron, 71
W. Va. 144, 75 S.E. 113 (1912).
In the instant case, the instruction was a complete and accurate
statement of the law of contributory negligence in West Virginia.
The instruction as given would not mislead the jury, for it was a
general rule of law which the jury was to apply should it find from
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the evidence any facts to which it was applicable. It is within the
discretion of the trial court to determine whether sufficient evidence
has been adduced to support a theory propounded by the instruction.
Rowan & Co. v. Hull, 55 W. Va. 335, 47 S.E. 92 (1904); 10 M.J.
Instructions § 20 (1950).
The rule in West Virginia concerning an abstract instruction
on contributory negligence, offered by the defendant, is that it does
not constitute reversible error if it is a correct statement of the
law, does not mislead the jury, and the theory it enunciates is supported by the evidence. The principal case reaffirms this view by
disapproving the holding of the Walker case, thus eradicating any
variance from our deep-rooted law on the doctrine of contributory
negligence.
David Mayer Katz

Torts-Private Hospitals-Liability For Refusal to Provide
Emergency Treatment
P's four month old child had been suffering from diarrhea. P
knew that the child's physician was not in his office on Wednesdays,
so they took the child to the emergency ward of D hospital for
medical assistance. The nurse refused to give treatment because of
the danger that the hospital's medication might conflict with that of
the attending physician. The nurse did not examine the child, but
the child was not in convulsions and was not crying or coughing.
The child died later that afternoon. In an action for wrongful
death the trial court refused D's motion for summary judgment. D
appealed. Held, affirming the trial court, that a private hospital
maintaining an emergency ward is liable for refusal of medical care
in case of an unmistakable emergency. Wilmington Gen. Hosp. v.
Manlove, 174 A.2d 135 (Del. 1961).
The principal case represents a new concept in the liability
of private hospitals. Formerly the courts held that a private hospital
had no duty to accept anyone whom it did not desire. In other cases
under similar circumstances, the courts have not even considered the
duty to admit patients. In these cases liability hinged on whether
the person had been admitted as a patient and then negligently
discharged. The principal case, however, has broadened the range
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